Customer-Supplier Relationship and M&A by 郎香香
学校编码：10384 
学号：32120100153534
         
博  士  学  位  论  文
         
客户-供应商关系与兼并收购
         
Customer-Supplier Relationship and M&A
         
郎香香
         
指导教师：李常青   
         
专业名称：财务学       
         














         





         
         
另外，该学位论文为(                  )课题(组)的研究成果
，获得(                    )课题(组)经费或实验室的资助，在(
          )实验室完成。(请在以上括号内填写课题或课题组负责人或
实验室名称，未有此项声明内容的，可以不作特别声明。)
         
         
         
声明人(签名)：
         
         














         







         
         
本学位论文属于：
         
         
(     )1.经厦门大学保密委员会审查核定的保密学位论文，于
年 月 日解密，解密后适用上述授权。
         
         
(     )2.不保密，适用上述授权。
         





         
         
         
声明人(签名)：
         
         














         






















































































































         
         
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) constitute a fundamental investment decision for
enterprises, as well as an essential channel to enter new industry and new
markets. M&A, whose role is no less vital than R&D investment or other capital
expenditures, is an important determinant to shareholding structure evolution
(Celikyurt, Sevilir and Shivdasani, 2010). In recent years, China's M&A market
becomes ever more active as an important means to industrial restructuring,
which is accompanied by a series of policies and measures aimed to encourage
M&A. In this context, studying how industrial linkages have affected M&A is of
great practical significance.
Previous research has shown that industrial characteristics and industrial linkage
have an effect on many business decisions, including financial decisions (MacKay
and Phillips, 2005), internal capital markets (Lamont, 1997), corporate
governance (Giroud and Mueller, 2010), etc. Studies as such emphasize that
there is a strategic interaction between enterprises and their competitors, which in
turn have some implications for basic issues in finance. Financial studies, in
contrast, while concerns mainly about the micro level, have ignored the
association between enterprises and the industry, especially the impact of
customer-supplier relationships on financial decisions. Although there is an
increasing interest in how customer and supplier relationships influence financial
decision-making, especially the decision of capital structure, the issue that how
customer and supplier relationships influence merger decisions is spares
(MacKay and Phillips on capital structure decisions, 2005; Shahrur, 2005;
Campello, 2006; Fee, Hadlock and Thomas, 2006). For a typical firm, M&A is a
major decision; as a result, examining the problem from a market-based
perspective will provide new evidence to the existent literature.













supplier relationships, and the resultant networks are built based on the input-
output data released by China’s National Bureau of Statistics. Based on these,
this paper examines how customer and supplier relationships alter the occurrence
and diffusion of M&A, as well as how M&A performance and executive
compensation is affected. Chapter 4 provides the details on quantifying customer
and supplier relationships; Chapter 5 through Chapter 7 present the empirical
studies on how customer and supplier relationships affect the occurrence,
diffusion and performance of M&A, and their impact on executive compensation.
The empirical research of this paper find that: in two closely related sectors, that
is, the two have tighter customer and supplier relationships, there is a higher
likelihood for vertical integration to take place. This paper takes an industry as a
node in the input-output network, in which market transactions and M&A steams
flow among them are regarded as a chain to link the nodes. By comparing
customer, supplier, and acquisitions network, it is discovered that customer,
supplier, and M&A networks share similar characteristics; in addition, there is a
significant correlation among indicators of the three networks, which further
confirms that there is an association between customer-supplier relationship and
M&A activities.
After investigating of the impact of customer and supplier relationships on M&A
occurrence, the paper proceeds to study the impact of customer and supplier
networks on M&A diffusion. Since M&A has externalities (Inderst and Wey, 2003;
Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2006), inter-industry M&As not only affect the industry
per se, but also impact on its supplier or customer industries. The next issue of
this paper is to scrutinize whether M&As in a customer or supplier industry would
incur follow-up M&As as a response to the crisis brought by the original M&A. The
empirical results show that M&A activities will be spread along industrial
relationships. If there are more vertical integrations in the network where an













industry will significantly increase.
Seeing that two industries can be either near or far from each other in a network,
we further study how vertical integration between enterprise of close proximity or
long distance affects M&As. If M&A spreads along the product market
relationships, then the brunt of M&A shocks will be borne by industries within
short distance to the M&A participants. Meanwhile, industries that have a close
trading relationship are more vulnerable to M&A impact, thus tend to react
quicker. The empirical results show that the closer a sector is from the industry i,
the greater the impact of vertical integration; the industry i responds more swiftly
to an initial M&A with a reaction. To be specific, a year after a short-distance
M&A, the industry i will initiate an M&A; in contrast, it is 2-3 years after a long-
distance M&A that the industry i will initiate a follow-up M&A. Therefore, it takes a
while for long-distance M&A to take effect.
After studying how customer and supplier relationship can affect M&A
occurrence, this paper analyzes their impact on M&A performance. The study
focuses on two aspects: one is to test M&A's announcement and after-M&A
operating performance; the other is to examine the market anticipation for M&A.
First, it analyzes the impact of customer and supplier relationships on M&A
announcement effects and operating performance. Unlike the conventional
wisdom that based on agency problem, this paper is built upon bargaining power
in the negotiation process, from which it analyzes M&A revenue and provides a
new way of thinking. It uses the strength of customer and supplier relationships to
proxy the asymmetry in bargaining power and found that when the target
company is an important supplier of the acquirer, then the acquirer has a lower
market returns around the M&A announcement; when the target company is a
key supplier or customer of the acquirer side, then the average performance of
the acquirer will go down in 3 years after M&A;if the acquirer is an important













M&A will go up. These results are consistent with the theoretical expectations of
bargaining power theory.
Many studies show that long before the M&A announcement, the market already
formed an anticipation, and this can cause the target and acquirer companies’
stock price to adjust gradually (Franks, Broyles and Hecht, 1977; Becher, 2009).
This paper, therefore, studies both the market reaction to the M&A announcement
and the market anticipation. If the market already anticipated the M&A, then
considering the reaction of the initial announcement only may underestimate the
wealth effect of M&A. For this reason, a comprehensive study of the market
performance of M&A is needed. In this paper, the main focus on market
anticipation includes: the existence of market anticipation, whether the closeness
of customer and supplier can influence M&A, or such proximity means the M&A
will be anticipated more frequently, and whether market anticipation can help
identify the bargaining power of the two parties. This study found that a
subsequent bidder has significant positive abnormal returns during the initial M&A
announcement; consequently, consider the actual income during M&A
announcement will underestimate the wealth effect of the two parties. M&As with
closely linked customers and suppliers tends to be anticipated more frequently;
after the M&A is anticipated, the market returns to an upstream M&A during the
announcement period is not significant; however, the market return to a
downstream M&A during the actual announcement period is significantly positive.
Market anticipation can identify only the closeness between customer and
supplier, but it cannot tell the degree of power asymmetry between customers
and suppliers.
After analyzing the performance vertical integration creates for shareholders and
investors, this paper goes on to study the payment performance created for the
executives. Using the ideas and methodology of mediating effect approach, this













compensation through M&A performance. It also combines the results of
mediating effect with the ratcheting effect of executive compensation. The results
show that the relationship between customer and supplier does affect the
executive compensation of both the target and the acquirer. When the acquirer
has a stronger bargaining power, while the company’s performance does not
improve significantly, its executive pay does. When the target has a stronger
bargaining power, the company’s performance will decline dramatically, but the
acquirer's executive compensation does not. This indicates the presence of a
ratchet effect in executive compensation. Because of the ratchet effect, while in
theory that customer and supplier relationships will affect executive compensation
of the acquirer via an influence on M&A performance, the empirical tests fail to
find the presence of this mediating effect. Besides pay ratchet effect, other
possible explanations might be that customer and supplier relationships affect
executive pay but through other channels, such as an increase in CEO reputation,
etc. These merit further research in the future.
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